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Risk Regulation at the Federal Level:
Administrative Procedure
Constraints and Opportunities
Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
Introduction1
Administrative agencies - the "twigs" on our fourth branch of
government - are established to handle the details of administration
deemed too painstaking, technically complex or even controversial for
direct Congressional or Presidential involvement.
In the current government structure, sometimes called the "modem
administrative state," these details of administration have taken on a
paramount importance to us all. The risks to public health and safety
have become so well documented and ventilated that the various
"acronymic" agencies that have been created to deal with the risks (e.g.,
OSHA, FDA, EPA) have become highly visible "twigs" indeed. But the
task of these agencies in the risk regulation area is not an easy one. It is,
indeed, extremely complex, painstaking and controversial - so much
so that the increasingly robust Congressional and Presidential
bureaucracies have gladly delegated major risk management
responsibilities to these agencies while seeking only to retain enough
oversight and other controls to prevent political problems from
penetrating the moat that separates the agency from the elected official.
To understand the task that awaits the federal risk regulator, one
must understand the legal framework in which he or she must operate.
* Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States: B.A.,
Cornell University; J.D., University of Chicago.
1 Except where indicated, the views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
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Of course, science, engineering, medicine and philosophy (not to
mention politics) play a crucial role in the substantive decision to be
made, but the process requirements often affect the timing and nature of
the ultimate decision.
Regulatory Statutes
Any discussion of the risk regulation process must begin with the
individual regulatory statutes. Examination of those statutes that
authorize regulation of cancer-causing chemicals, for example, shows
different approaches to assessment of risks, burden of proof, data
generation and the balancing of costs and benefits.
As was pointed out in the 1983 National Academy of Science Risk
Assessment study, 2 several laws require the regulating agencies to
balance costs and benefits before issuing rules or orders that regulate the
use of carcinogenic chemicals. Other statutes involve the establishment
of technology-based exposure controls, and a few mandate control
techniques to reduce risks to zero whenever the hazard is identified. The
best known example of a zero-tolerance statute is, of course, the
Delaney Clause in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 3 As the
Academy study pointed out:4
There can be little question that differing statutory
standards for decision affect the weight that agencies accord
risk assessments.... If risk is but one of several criteria that a
regulator must consider or if data are expensive to obtain, it
would not be surprising if an agency devoted less effort to
risk assessment.
2 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL
MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS, 40-50 (1983).

3 The clause bars the approval of food additives shown to induce cancer in
animals or humans; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A) [food additives]; 360b(d)(1)(H)
[animal drugs]; 376(b)(5)(B) [color additives].
4 NAS Report, supranote 2, at 43.
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The procedure called for in risk-regulation statutes may also differ
markedly between those that involve premarketing approval of
substances and those that utilize post-hoc mechanisms such as emission
limits. Peter Huber illustrated some of the ramifications that flow from
the procedural distinction when he differentiated between what he called
"screening" procedures (e.g., permission is sought from the FDA
through an advance licensing procedure) and "standard setting" (e.g., as
initiated by OSHA or CPSC to tell industry how to set up its work place
or construct a toy). 5 He perceived a bias in favor of screening out new
6
risks and for simply setting standards for the production of old risks:
Thus, we set standards for cars, but screen aircraft. We
set standards to control the old hazards of burning coal, but
screen new nuclear power plants. Under the Toxic
Substances Control Act, EPA is supposed to screen all major
new productions of 'new' chemicals, but is directed merely
to set standards for the production and handling of old ones.
EPA screens new pesticides but for the most part leaves the
old ones alone.
This difference between screening and standard setting obviously
affects the burden of proof. A screening agency can put the onus on the
license applicant to prove that its product is safe and effective - an
expensive proposition that may dampen innovation (such as orphan
drugs where the potential payoff may not be great enough to overcome
the cost of approval) and may drive applicants to seek economies of
scale as through proposals for larger and larger nuclear plants. The
screening process also places the cost of delay on the applicant and the
benefit of delay on the opponent-intervenor.
The standard-setting agency, on the other hand, must develop the
scientific evidence necessary to support the intended restriction - a task
5 Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, Regulation, Nov/Dec
1983, 23-32. See also, Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 U.
VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983).
6 Id.,at 24.
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made more arduous and expensive by the typical statutory admonition to
the agency, common in such statutes, to take the costs of regulation into
account. It is unsurprising then that, in Huber's terms, the "exorcist"
standard-setting agency usually goes after the big targets and is often
accused of slothful action by the public interest groups, while the
"gatekeeper" licensing agencies often are accused of regressive, overcautious actions by the business community.
Much more could be said about the importance of the procedural
scheme created by the regulatory statutes themselves. But until a
consensus develops around when licensing is to be preferred over
standard setting, the regulator will take the legislative cards dealt, and
then consult the rules of administrative procedure to see how the game
must be played. Whether these rules provide more opportunities than
constraints, is the subject of this paper.
The Administrative Procedure Act
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) 7
basically governs the following activities of federal agencies (unless
later statutes provide otherwise): (1) Rulemaking, (2) Adjudication, (3)
Judicial review of agency action, (4) Access to agency information
(Freedom of Information Act amendment), and (5) Open meetings
(Government in the Sunshine Act amendment).
Under the APA, all agency action is either rulemaking or
adjudication. Licensing is adjudication (albeit with some special
treatment) and standard setting is rulemaking.
Rulemaking Under the APA
Rulemaking is the issuance of an agency statement of future effect,
usually of general applicability. Most agencies are expressly authorized
by Congress to make their general policies known to the regulated
7

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521.
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entities and to the public through the issuance of rules. The statutory
procedure for issuing rules is simple. A notice of the proposed rule is
published in a nationally available government publication known as the
Federal Register. The public is given an opportunity to comment on the
proposal - usually for 30 or 60 days - although this step may be
skipped in certain emergency circumstances or where the the rule is
deemed to be of little public interest. The agency must consider the
comments and publish the final rule, explaining how it responds to the
comments. Such rules are subject to challenge in court - usually
8
directly in the court of appeals.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, author of the leading treatise on
administrative law has proclaimed that notice-and-comment rulemaking
is "one of the greatest inventions of modem government." 9 The basic
APA procedure is quite streamlined: proposed rule, comment period,
final rule with explanation. But as the importance of, and skirmishing
over, agency rulemaking increased, courts and Congress began to
demand more of rulemakers. Courts began to demand expanded notices
of proposed rulemaking, including information on the agency's "intent
to rely" on specific information in its possession. The "rulemaking
record" became the focus of judicial scrutiny and in some cases courts
demanded that agencies allow oral argument or even cross-examination
to air controversial issues in the proceeding. 10 Congress, for its part,
began to pass statutes, labeled "hybrid rulemaking" statutes which
departed from the APA and required public hearings and cross-

8 See generally, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (1983) (Revised edition forthcoming.).
9 Administrative Law Treatise (1970 Supplement) (§ 6.15); reaffirmed in 1
Administrative Law Treatise (2nd ed. 1978) (§ 6.1).
10 See, e.g., International Harverster Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), and other cases described in Williams, "HybridRulemaking" Under the
Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev.
401 (1975).
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examination. Many of these statutes are key risk regulation statutes: the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970),11 the Consumer Product
Safety Act (1972),12 the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974),13 the Clean
Water Act (1977),14 and the Clean Air Act Amendments (1977).15
This trend toward formalization of rulemaking was arrested in the
late 1970s. The Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee decision in 197816
barred reviewing courts from requiring agencies to use additional
procedures not required by the APA (or other statutes). The
Administrative Conference's studies of hybrid rulemaking statutes like
the FTC's Magnuson-Moss Act also reached the conclusion that such
procedures have not been effective and urged that "Congress should not
ordinarily require, for agency rulemaking, procedures in addition to
those specified by section 553 of the APA, although the agencies should
' 17
have the discretion to utilize them."
Impact Statements
Although it was generally recognized that procedural encrustation of
rulemaking may have gone too far, the concern remained that agencies
ought to give special attention to the impact of their regulations. The
granddaddy of the "impact statement" approach was the 1970 National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 18 that directs all agencies to provide
11 Pub. L. No. 91-596, rulemaking provision codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655.
12
13
14
15

Pub. L. No. 92-573, rulemaking provision codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2056.
Pub. L. No. 93-523, rulemaking provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(d).
Pub. L. No. 95-217, rulemaking provision codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a).
Pub. L. No. 95-95, rulemaking provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d).

16 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
17 ACUS Recommendation 80-1, 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1. See Boyer, Report in
Support of Recommendation 80-1 in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE

U.S. [hereinafter ACUS], 1980 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 33-204.
18 Pub. L. No. 91-190,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347.
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an environmental impact statement with all proposals for "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
This requirement, which has been rather aggressively enforced by the
courts, applies to the gamut of agency actions including rules, licenses,
construction plans and procurements.
Modeled on NEPA was the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1981,19
which only applies to rulemaking. The Act requires rulemaking agencies
to produce a regulatory flexibility analysis (essentially a small business
impact statement). This requirement is overseen by the Small Business
Administration, but is not enforceable in court.
OMB Review
A series of Presidential Executive Orders has given the President
(through the Office of Management and Budget) a crucial role in clearing
and coordinating Executive branch regulations, while also making use
of the impact statement approach to analyzing regulatory costs and
benefits. Executive Order 1229120 issued by President Reagan soon
after his inauguration mandates OMB clearance of all proposed and final
rules and also requires a preliminary and final "regulatory analysis" for
any major rule (i.e., a rule with an annual effect on the economy
exceeding $100 million or having significant impact on costs, prices,
competition, employment, investment, or innovation). A later Executive
Order, 12498,21 required agencies to provide OMB with their
regulatory plans for the upcoming year, with the general admonition that
22
matters not in the plan could not normally be pursued by the agency.
19 Pub.L. No.96-354, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612.
20 Federal Regulation, Exec. Order 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
21 Regulatory Planning Process, Exec. Order 12498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
22 For a description of how the OMB views its accomplishments, see Regulatory
Program of the United States (April 1, 1988, March 31, 1987), Executive Office of
the President (1989) (especially Part 1, Overview and Summary). See also Bruff,
I RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 43 [Winter 1990]

OMB's authority in this regard was bolstered by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 198023 which gave it the power to clear any agency
"information collection requests" including those imposed through
rulemaking. This Act applies to all agencies, including independent
regulatory commissions not covered by the Executive Order.
The most recent application of the impact statement approach is
Executive Order 12612,24 which requires Executive branch agencies to
provide OMB with "Federalism Assessments" whenever proposed
agency actions have the potential of affecting state laws or prerogatives.
What is a Rulemaker to Do?
Assuming a decision has been made to proceed with a proposed
regulation - a decision that ought to imply a rational choice from
among competing priorities, the agency rulemaker's navigational job has
just begun. From the outset he or she must prepare for each stage of the
process carefully and with an eye to the likely court challenge that awaits
most significant rules once the agency head signs off on the final rule.
The APA requirements are relatively easy to satisfy. What is more
difficult and challenging is assembling the various impact statements that
may be required, marshalling the information and evidence in support of
the rule (including persuasive responses to all "cogent comments"
received during the comment period) and persuading OMB that the
benefits of the rule outweigh its costs. Obviously, this requires deft
management, close coordination with agency program staff, lawyers
and policymakers, negotiations with OMB desk officers, and facility in
technical writing as well as in "plain English" writing. It necessitates
judicious use of consultants to help prepare the sophisticated regulatory
Presidential Management of Agency

Rulemaking in ACUS, 1988

RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 527.

23 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520.
24 Federalism, Exec. Order 12612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987).
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analyses and other impact statements. It also requires attention to the
probable application of the Freedom of Information Act 25 (which
commenters often use to seek insights into agency predilections), the
Government in the Sunshine Act 26 (requiring open meeting of multimember agencies), the Ethics in Government Act2 7 (involving possible
recusal issues), and rules restricting the receipt of ex parte
communications. 28
There are few shortcuts in the process of promulgating a major rule.
However, several techniques advocated by the Administrative
Conference of the U.S. (ACUS) may help.
Generic Rules
It was early recognized that licensing agencies should seek to identify
recurring environmental issues appropriate for resolution in a "generic"
proceeding. 29 More recently, the ACUS study of OSHA rulemaking,
performed by Professors McGarity and Shapiro, pointed out the
advantages of generic regulations such as industry-wide, multiplechemical or work-practice standards. 30 The short-term costs of
25 Pub. L. No. 89-554 (as amended), 5 U.S.C. § 552.
26 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
27 Pub. L. No. 95-521 (as amended); 5 U.S.C. Appendix (§§ 201-210 concerning
executive personnel financial disclosure requirements); 18 U.S.C. § 207 (postemployment restrictions). A recent Executive Order issued by President Bush sets
forth 14 principals of ethical conduct for executive branch employees: Principles of
Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees, Exec. Order 12674,
(1989).
28 See the APA's provision concerning barring ex parte (off-the-record) contracts in
adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d). With respect to informal rulemaking, the APA is
silent, but some courts have imposed restrictions, see Home Box Office. Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING, supra note 8, Ch. 7.
29 See ACUS Recommendation 73-6, Procedures for Resolution of Environmental
Issues in Licensing Proceedings, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-6 (1988).
30 See McGarity and Shapiro, OSHA Regulation: Regulatory Alternatives and
I RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 43 [Winter 19901

undertaking such a broadly applicable standard would, if it could be
achieved, ease future rulemakings immensely. OSHA has, indeed,
31
already followed this advice in a proposed generic rulemaking.
Building Consensus
Obviously, the rulemaking's process hurdles are lowered
considerably when consensus is substituted for contentiousness.
Moreover, in a litigious atmosphere (80 percent of all EPA rules are
challenged in court) 32 attempts to achieve consensus have a high
potential payoff.
Interaction with private standard-setting organizations
ACUS has recommended that agencies should draw on the
knowledge of active technical committees that develop relevant
voluntary consensus standards and should interact with such
committees. 3 3 Of course, the procedures and composition of such
committees must be carefully considered by the agencies in determining
the weight to be given to their work product.
Advisory Committees
An agency can appoint a body of outside experts to advise it on its
Legislative Reform, 1987 ACUS Report 999, 1012-1020; Shapiro and McGarity,
Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J.

Reg. 1, 27-31 (1989); ACUS Recommendation 87-10, Regulation by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-10 (1988).
31 See Generic Standard for Exposure Monitoring (OSHA advance notice of
proposed rulemaking) 53 Fed. Reg. 37591 (September 27, 1988).
32 See EPA PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION,
AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA'S NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACTIVITIES, 1,
(December 1987) in ACUS, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK Ch. 1,

appendix (forthcoming).
33 ACUS Recommendation 78-4, Federal Agency Interaction With Private

Standard-Setting Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, 1 C.F.R. § 305.784 (1988).
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rulemaking. Such committees must, however, be chartered and operated
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 34 (and their creation is
subject to advance notice to OMB under E.O. 12498). Once established,
advisory committees can assist agencies by explaining technical issues,
promoting dialogue with outside experts and providing a form of peer
review of the agency's decisions. The FDA has traditionally relied
heavily on advisory committees whereas OSHA, which has some
statutory restrictions on the composition of advisory committees, has
35
largely eschewed their use.
Negotiated Rulemaking
Finally, in some cases true consensus can be reached prior to the
proposed rule stage. This is the goal of negotiated rulemaking which has
been strongly endorsed by ACUS. 36 Several health and safety agencies
(EPA, FAA, OSHA) have used this approach - which calls for
convening representatives of all interested parties into a negotiating
committee under agency auspices - with some success. "Reg neg" may
not be well suited for all rulemakings, but in most of the 19 instances
where it has been tried (by eight different departments and agencies),
areas of controversy have been eliminated or at least narrowed
37
considerably.
Adjudication Under the APA
Regulatory programs normally involve a mix of rulemaking and
adjudication. Standard-setting agencies like OSHA must also investigate
34 5 U.S.C. app.
35 See McGarity and Shapiro, supra note 30, at 1039.
36 ACUS Recommendations 82-4, 85-5, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed
Regulations, 1 C F.R. § 305.82-4, 85-5.

37 See "Agency Experience with Negotiated Rulemaking," in ACUS,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK Ch. 10 (forthcoming).
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and enforce violations of their regulations. (In OSHA's case, the civil
penalty violation is adjudicated by a separate agency - the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission.) Screening agencies like FDA
or NRC principally rely on adjudications to rule on the safety and/or
effectiveness of proposed new drugs or power plants. Of course, those
agencies can and do issue regulations designed to resolve issues that
recur in adjudications. The Supreme Court has upheld, generally,
agency discretion to make policy through rulemaking or adjudication,
provided appropriate procedures are followed. 38
Under the APA, if the statute under which the agency is conducting
the program calls for an adjudication (whether it be an enforcement
action, license application or benefit claim) that is "required to be
determined on the record after an agency hearing," then the APA
procedures apply. 39 These procedures, generally speaking, require use
of a special type of agency employee - an administrative law judge
(ALJ) - to preside over the hearing and make an initial decision in the
case. (Theoretically, the head of the agency may preside, but practically,
ALJs are used in nearly all APA hearings.
Administrative Law Judges
ALJs are given special status and independence by the APA.
Although they are technically agency employees, they are selected by the
agencies off a special register maintained by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). The selection process for ALJs is quite rigorous.
At a minimum, an ALJ applicant must have at least seven years of
experience in administrative law and/or trial experience as an attorney or
a judge. OPM then rates the applicant on a 100-point scale, based on a
review of the applicant's experience, a written demonstration and a
38 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
39 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). See generally, Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications:
Trying to See the Forestand the Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS AND J. 383 (1984).
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panel interview. Agencies then fill vacancies from the top of the
40
register.
OPM prescribes ALJs' pay. ALJs may not be assigned duties
inconsistent with their duties as ALJs, their job performance may not be
formally evaluated by the agencies, they may not be advised or
consulted by agency investigators or prosecutors, and they may not be
fired or reprimanded unless charges are brought against them by the
agency in a formal procedure 4 1
Other "Non-AL" Adjudicators
The APA permits the use of other types of adjudicators in certain types
of cases. In cases that are not required by statute to be heard under the
APA, the agency is free to craft its procedure and use any employee to
preside so long as the due process clause is satisfied. And, Congress
can always specify in other laws that a particular type of adjudicator be
used (e.g., a panel of lawyers, physicists, engineers, or environmental
scientists in nuclear power plant licensing cases). As a consequence,
there are several major programs (immigration appeals, federal
employee appeals, veterans' benefit cases) where specified non-ALJ
adjudicators preside over cases that are otherwise similar to APA
cases. 42
Agency Review
In general, once an initial decision is made by the agency presiding
40 For a detailed description of the AU_ selectioh process, see Sharon and
Pettibone, Merit Selection of FederalAdministrativeLaw Judges, 70 JUDICATURE
216 (1987).
41 See the various protections in 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 1305, 3105, 4302, 5372,

7521.
42 See Robie and Morse, The FederalExecutive Branch Adjudicator:Alive (and)
Well Outside the Administrative Procedure Act? 33 FED. BAR NEWS AND J. 133

(1986).
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officer, the losing party (sometimes the agency staff) has an opportunity
to seek review by the agency head (or his designee). If no review is
sought, the agency head may call the case up "on his own motion."
The APA provides that the agency head has "all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision."43 This broad power to
reverse or modify the presiding officer's decision has been tempered by
court decisions requiring the agency head to justify such a change,
44
especially where the initial decision was based on witness testimony.
Agencies have discretion as to how they structure their appeal process.
Some agency heads (usually boards or commissions) hear appeals
themselves; other have created special panels or individual positions to
45
hear such appeals.
Adjudication of Scientific Issues
The above description outlines the normal adjudication procedure
used by the approximately 40 agencies that employ or borrow ALJs to
preside over their formal hearings. It is a well-understood system,
heavily dependent on the cadre of over 1,000 merit-selected, legally
trained ALJs. Although the system has its critics who desire faster
decision-making or more independent judges, it seems to work
relatively well for the mine run of disputes over benefit claims, labor
relations practices, or civil money penalties - where "adjudicative
facts" are at issue. However, where the disputes concern "legislative
facts" or policy issues, especially those on the frontiers of scientific
43 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).

44 See, e.g., Brock v. LX. Meyers Co., High Voltage Div. 818 F.2d 1270, 1277

(6th Cir. 1987). (Commission must articulate reasons for its failure to credit Al's
findings, where ALl had "unique opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses....")
45 See Cases, Agency Review of Administrative Law Judges' Decisions, 66
B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986); ACUS Recommendation 83-3, Agency Structure for Review
of Decisions of Presiding Officers Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 C.F.R.

§ 305.83-3 (1988).
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knowledge, the adjudicative hearing before a legally trained decider
becomes more anomalous.46
Although APA adjudication procedures can be, and are, regularly
invoked by Congress whenever dispute resolution procedures are called
for, this may not always make sense. For example, it seems perfectly
appropriate to allow (and due process may require allowing) a company
charged with a safety violation by OSHA to put on a defense with its
own witnesses and an opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses
before an administrative law judge. However, if the FDA must decide
whether a new food additive should be allowed on the market in the face
of charges that it may cause cancer, it seems doubtful that a legal trial is
the best procedure.
What is an Adjudicator to Do?
Unless Congress has authorized a deviation from the APA (either
specifically or by not requiring a hearing "on the record"), the agency
may be required to offer an ALJ hearing. But there are avenues for a
risk regulator to pursue in seeking to improve dispute resolution
procedures.
Flexibility within the APA
As Paul Verkuil has noted, the APA itself presents "opportunities for
procedural reform that have been underutilized or even ignored since its
enactment., 4 7 Several provisions allow significant procedural
flexibility in initial licensing cases that might be important in some risk
regulatory areas. For example, in initial licensing, under the APA, "an
agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby adopt
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written
46 See K. C. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2nd ed.) (§ 6.16).
47 Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 313 (1978).
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form. ' 4 8 Moreover, in initial licensing an agency may assign the
recommended decision to a "responsible employee" who need not be an
ALJ.49 Finally, an agency need not follow the normal separation-offunctions restrictions in such cases. 5 0 That is, an agency decisionmaker could, according to the APA, consult with staff experts without
worrying whether they might have been involved in that proceeding or a
factually related one. There may, of course, be some inhibition on
agencies taking full advantage of these provisions (or they may be
superseded by the regulatory statute), but it would behoove agency
decision-makers to take another look at the APA.
Departures from the APA
Agencies can, of course, seek exceptions or modifications from the
APA procedures. Congress has sometimes shown its willingness to
depart from the APA. For example, in NRC nuclear plant licensing
cases, Congress authorized three-member panels to hear the cases with
legal and technical experts on the panels. Or the agency can try to
convince Congress that alternative dispute resolution procedures should
be tried. Commentators have suggested that a deficiency in the APA,
notwithstanding its flexibility in some types of cases, is the absence of
procedures for informal adjudication, i.e., those that do not require trialtype hearings. 5 1 The APA contains no real procedures covering those
agency adjudications.
Voluntary Alternatives
Although Congress has required FDA to offer a "formal evidentiary
48 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
49 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
50 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
51 See Gardner, The ProceduresBy Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 ADMIN.
L. REV. 155 (1972) (proposing an informal procedure statute).
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hearing" in disputes over applications for food additives or for new
drugs, the FDA has sought to avoid unnecessary use of adversary
procedure by offering three voluntary alternatives: a hearing before the
Commissioner of the FDA, a hearing before an advisory committee or a
hearing before a Public Board of Inquiry (PBO).52
The PBOI is perhaps the most interesting variation, despite the fact
that it has only been tried twice. As Professor Shapiro's study for the
Administrative Conference shows, the PBOI is the closest analogue in
government to the oft-proposed science court. 53 It consists of a panel
of three scientists appointed by the Commissioner of FDA - two of
which are selected from recommendations of the parties. The Board
obtains scientific "testimony" within an informal quasi-adjudicative
hearing framework in which the advocacy role of lawyers is minimized
in favor of a "scientific forum" approach - although the Board's
decision is an "initial decision" and has the same legal status as an initial
decision of an ALJ.
The Administrative Conference concluded that:54
Other agencies with regulatory programs that depend on
scientific determinations should consider experimental use of
a process similar to PBOI as a voluntary alternative to a
hearing that would otherwise be held to resolve issues of
scientific uncertainty.
It seems clear that greater experimentation is called for in this area. If
agencies are to be charged with making the best scientific decisions,
then perhaps scientific method should, in appropriate circumstances,
substitute for legal method. This in turn would require a willingness on
52 See Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures:
Evaluating the FDA's PublicBoardof Inquiry, 1986 DUKE LJ.288.
53 See Kantrowitz, Proposalfor an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
SCIENCE 763 (1967) and other sources cited in Shapiro, supranote 52 at 299-300.
54 ACUS Statement on hearing procedures for the resolution of scientific issues, 1
C.F.R. § 310.11 (1988).
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the part of Congress to depart from the APA in appropriate
circumstances. It is a challenge for leaders in the risk regulation
community to help develop methods for doing so while safeguarding the
democratic need for public participation and due process of law.
Conclusion
Two primary types of policy-making procedure in administrative law
are available to risk regulators: rulemaking and adjudication.
Rulemaking under the APA may be quite informal, requiring only
adequate notice and opportunity for comment. On the other hand, APA
adjudication normally requires a trial presided over by a legally trained
judge.
What is ironic is that as the inappropriateness of APA adjudication to
disputes over scientific and technical questions is increasingly wellrecognized, the simplicity of notice-and-comment rulemaking is being
lost through a proliferation of legislatively and presidentially-imposed
additions to the process.
Clearly there is a need for new thinking in the area of risk regulation
procedures. 55 The current system, while manageable to skilled
navigators, is not conducive to the merger of scientific method and legal
method.

55 A potentially fruitful approach is "risk comparison," examined by Baram, Use
of Comparative Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13 COLUM. J.

ENVTL. L. 1 (1987).

